| Introduction
The debate on globalisation
has been raging now for some ten years. Starting from a celebratory
account of a borderless world [Ohmae (1990)], scepticism about the
extent and the novelty of globalisation [Hirst and Thompson (1995;
1999)], fear and loathing about its destructive consequences [Sassen
(1998), Burbach (1997)] the debate has continued. This is a debate
which excites sharp differences in books written by developed country
authors [see for a contrast Friedman (1999), Grieder (1997), Barnes
(1999) all writing from a US perspective] as much as writings by
developing country authors [Amin (1997)]. The State has been pronounced
as powerless in the face of globalisation [Ohmae (1990)] and in
turn the powerless State has been denounced as a myth [Weiss (1998)].
Many fear that globalisation has brought about the rule by global
corporations who are bound by no law except that of money making
[Korten (1995)], that the new order is creating a 'global apartheid'
[Alexander (1996)].
The position taken
in this paper avoids any of the extremes of hope or fear. Globalisation
is a phase of capitalism, but not so much a new phenomenon as a
revival or resumption of a similar phase in the late 19th
Century. As such, it is in its early stages of development. Capitalism
in its global phase is taken to be a disequilibrium dynamic system
which reproduces itself through cycles and crises. This is what
I have elsewhere labelled a classical or a nineteenth century Marxist
view [Desai, (forthcoming), (2000)]. Thus it is neither a utopia
[Friedman (199) or Ohmae (1990)] nor a dystopia [Burbach (1997),
Barnes (1999)]. In order to understand globalisation as a phase
of Capitalism, it is necessary to revive certain ideas from classical
political economy. The main idea is that of the economy is an organism
which is the result of human action but not of human design. Adam
Smith and Karl Marx share such a view which was doggedly held and
propounded during the twentieth century by Hayek [For a comparison
of Marx and Hayek, see Desai (1997) and Sciabarra (1995)].
The organicist view
is contrasted with a mechanistic view which I argue prevailed through
much of the twentieth century thinking. This view considers the
economy (or society) as a result of a deliberate if faulty design
and holds certain agents - capitalists/corporations, government/politicians,
bankers/jews - as responsible for the design and operation of the
machine that is the economy. Thus in this view, globalisation could
be a creation of Western powers or global/transnational/multinational
corporations. Their ideology would be the hegemonic ideology.
It would then be programmatic to regulate/overcome/abolish such
malevolent agents and establish a world government or New New Deal
etc.
The view taken here
is that globalisation is neither a utopia nor is it merely or creation
of ideology. Ideas, especially the revival of the nineteenth century
organicist ideas play a crucial role in our understanding of globalisation.
But even then organicism has to be distinguished from neo-liberal
or conservative ideology which is often as mechanistic as its socialist
twin.
In order to lay down
some markers, I list the characteristics of globalisation and its
consequences in Box 1. This is done for reasons of brevity but
the lists are as ecumenical as is possible in such a subject. After
that, the history of capitalism over the years 1870-1970 is succinctly
described. [A more detailed version is available in a book length
manuscript which will see publication in the near future Desai (forthcoming).]
This history is central to the question as to whether globalisation
is a mere ideological epi-phenomenon or something more substantial.
The history then leads to an articulation of the period 1970-1990
which is crucial to the break-up of the phase of 'capitalism in
one country' that ruled in the short twentieth century 1914-1989.
It also allows us to contrast the two philosophical views - organiscist
and mechanist - in a simple form in Table 1.
Following
this somewhat lengthy introduction, there follows an analysis of
the contemporary phase of globalisation. Three questions are posed
and answered - why has globalisation happened and happened
now, whether it is a benevolent or a malevolent process and
if there are any predictable limits to the process that globalisation
represents. A historically specific but analytically coherent account
is presented in the brad tradition of Classical (as against Leninist)
Marxian political economy. The essay concludes by bringing together
the main elements of the essay.
BOX
1
CHARACTERISTICS OF GLOBALISATION
(a)
deregulated capital markets with the possibility of speedy
transfer of capital;
(b)
communications and information technology which makes possible
ìaction at a distance in real timeî which can be very short
(c)
active forex markets with supporting financial markets with
new products [e.g. derivatives, options] which allows speculators
to take positions in any currency around the world where there
are potential profit opportunities;
(d)
greater geographical spread and increased mobility
of fixed, i.e. direct, investment;
(e)
rapid and linked reactions as between different financial
markets which work round the world round the clock, as well
as between financial markets and forex markets;
(f)
the emergence of a global media network linked with a global
communications network;
(g)
the fashioning a of a global consumer culture and a global
music/film/TV culture benefiting from all the above, especially
[b] and [f];
(h)
increased but as yet imperfect and legally impeded mobility
of labour;
(i)
greater awareness, though, as yet, not very effective redress
of human rights violations, ecological disasters, famines
and refugee problems, benefiting from [b] and [f];
(j)
speeding up of technological change leading to increased concentration
of capital via mergers and takeovers but at the same time
increased competition between the surviving large companies.
CONSEQUENCES OF GLOBALISATION
(l)
reduced control of the nation state over its macro economic
affairs especially in the matter of budgetary policy and monetary
policy;
(2)
increased volatility of forex and financial markets;
(3) displacement
of manufacturing industry from its old locations in the North
to selected locations - Asia, Latin America - in the South;
(4) a
dematerialisation of the industrial products [the weightless
economy];
(5) a
feeling of increased job insecurity in the North as well as
the South;
(6)
increasing feminisation of the labour force;
(7) rapid
spread of new technology embodied in new investment in the
favoured locations of foreign direct investment;
(8) rapid
industrialisation, despite some recent setbacks, of Asian
economies;
(9)
increased marginalisation of economies previously reliant
on intergovernmental aid who are unable to attract capital,
especially in Sub Saharan Africa.
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